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DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF A NEW AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
FOR VALIDATING THE SENDER OF AN EMAIL
Sai B Sakamuri
ABSTRACT
A new authentication mechanism for validating the source of messages over the
Internet is designed and evaluated. This mechanism is applied to email and is called
Email++. Email++ prevents identity forging (spoofing) and tampering of email contents.
By preventing identity forging, Email++ can reduce the amount of spam received and
limit the spread of viruses like Melissa, Love Bug, Bagle Worm, and Killer Resume.
Email++ validates both the sender and the receiver of an email by confirming the
sender’s identity with the domain mail server that delivered the email for the sender, and
authenticates the receiver with hash value comparisons.

Email++ enables payment

mechanisms, including micro-cash, and challenge response schemes that use puzzle
solving.
MD5 hash signatures generated both at the sender and the receiver locations are
used for validating the sender’s identity and for making email tamper resistant in the
network.

An out-of-band TCP connection established between the sender and the

receiver is used as a communication channel for validating the sender as well as the
sender’s email server. The information needed for establishing an out-of-band TCP

vii

connection is obtained by querying the DNS (Domain Naming System), instead of using
email headers from the received mail, which are susceptible to spoofing.
The Email++ technique is compared with existing anti spam and anti-spoof
techniques like SPF, Yahoo Domain Keys, Microsoft Sender ID, TEOS and PGP. The
Email++ specification is evaluated by developing both Email++ client and Email++
server programs in C language and using Sendmail 8.12 as the mail server. The
performance of Email++ is compared with standard SMTP protocol implementation of
Sendmail 8.12.

Several factors are considered in evaluating the performance. CPU

demand, memory demand, bandwidth demand, email latency, and extra DNS load are
measured for both email sender and the receiver. The performance evaluation results
show that Email++ adds an extra CPU demand of about 11%. The extra memory required
by Email++ is nearly 3%. The bandwidth demand of Email++ is around 15% greater than
the standard SMTP for sending 500 emails of 3.5KB each. Extra load on DNS increases
by one connection for every incoming mail at the receiver.

viii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Spam is becoming a major security threat to email systems. According to Verisign
Inc. 80% of messages handled by its clients are classified as spam [34]. To date there is
no perfect solution to stop spam completely, but groups of techniques can reduce the
amount of spam. This thesis investigates a new method to reduce spam by preventing
spoofing of email addresses.
1.2 Motivation
Network protocols and applications are designed based on the concept of trusting
the network and its users. Security was not a vital concern when the original Internet
protocols were being designed. Hence, protocols such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) are all susceptible to spoofing.
Vulnerabilities present in SMTP have made possible problems like spamming, phishing,
email generated viruses and zombie SMTP servers. All the above techniques use email
address spoofing; According to Federal Trade Commission’s report [15] 33% of the
spammed emails are spoofed; Reference [23] shows 50% of email is spoofed. A study by
Verisign Inc. shows that 93% of the phished emails are spoofed [36]; 100% of email
1

generated viruses are spoofed. The underlying security hazard of these security threats is
spoofing. Consequently, there is a need to incorporate sender authentication in SMTP,
which is the main contribution of this thesis.
1.3 Contribution of this Thesis
This thesis investigates the problem of spoofing, in particular in email systems, and
proposes a new authentication mechanism for avoiding email forgery. Contributions
include:
•

Review of existing proposals to control spam and email spoofing

•

Design and implementation of Email++, a new sender authentication mechanism
that will prevent spoofing and in turn help reduce spam.

•

Comparison of Email++ to existing anti-spoof and anti spam techniques.

•

Performance evaluation of Email++ and description of the adaptation of this
authentication mechanism to other systems.

1.4 Organization of this Thesis
This section describes the organization of the remainder of this thesis
•

Chapter 2 describes the background of SMTP and spam, and reviews existing
methods used to control spam

•

Chapter 3 describes the new email sender authentication mechanism called
Email++, and describes the design, implementation, operation and validation of
Email++

2

•

Chapter 4 compares Email++ with other popular existing sender authentication
mechanisms like SPF, Yahoo Domain Keys, sender ID, Microsoft ticket server,
PGP, and TEOS

•

Chapter 5 evaluates the performance of Email++ with respect to CPU utilization,
memory demand, bandwidth demand, email latency, and DNS load

•

Chapter 6 presents conclusions and discusses future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND ON EMAIL AND SPAM
2.1 Overview of the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
This chapter describes SMTP, SMTP forging, the problem of spam and the
existing techniques used to control spam.
2.1.1 History of Email and Origin of SMTP
Originally, email was designed for the communication of information between
groups of researches in the ARPANET network [4]. Even though the operation of email
may appear simple, there are many conventions, standards and protocols behind its
operation.
ARPANET, the research project of DARPA (Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency) was the predecessor of the Internet. In order for the small circle of
ARPANET users to be able to communicate, SNDMSG [19], the first email program,
was developed and deployed. The earliest protocol used for delivering the mail was FTP.
Some additional functionality was added to FTP to make it efficient for delivering mail.
A separate protocol for email delivery was proposed and submitted to the IETF as RFC
821 [27] in 1982. This RFC described Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) for
handling mail. Later in 1989, RFC1123 [8] was developed to clarify and improve some of
the specifications of RFC821. RFC 1425 [20] describes a framework over which all the

4

future extensions of SMTP can be built in a consistent way. RFC821, RFC1123 and
RFC1425, collectively have been the core specification of SMTP for years.
2.1.2 Overview of SMTP
Internet email systems are client/server, store-and-forward systems that primarily
uses SMTP and POP3 or IMAP for communication. The main components involved in
the system are the sender User Agent (UA), sender Message Transfer Agent (MTA),
receiver UA, receiver MTA and communication protocol. The UA provides the interface
between the user and his/her email server. The UA can be described as a program the
email user uses to compose or read messages. Sender UA interacts with the sender,
accepts the message from the sender, and transfers the mail to the sender’s mail server by
establishing a network connection to the sender’s mail server. Receiver UA helps the
receiver in retrieving the messages from his/her mail server by establishing a network
connection to their mail server. The MTAs also referred to as email servers are
responsible for collecting emails from the senders and delivering them to the receiver’s
MTA. The message can be delivered directly to the receiver MTA, or may pass through
several intermediate MTAs before reaching the destination. To ensure reliability and
assure delivery of emails TCP/IP is used as the transport protocol. The communication
protocols used are SMTP and IMAP or POP3. SMTP is the protocol used to exchange
messages between MTAs, and also by a UA to send messages to its MTA. POP3 or
IMAP are used by receivers to retrieve messages from their MTA.
The sender UA initiates the communication with the sender’s mail server when a
request to send mail is received from the sender. It establishes a two-way TCP
5

communication channel to the sender’s MTA on port 25, and the mail is delivered to the
sender MTA through the established channel. The SMTP protocol is used for the
communication between UA and the MTA.
The SMTP protocol defines a set of commands, which include information about
the sender, receiver, and contents of the mail. The sender MTA accordingly receives the
commands, processes them and replies with success or failure status codes. Figure 2.1
shows the flow of email using SMTP.

Figure 2.1: Flow of Email Using SMTP
The MTA processes the mail and places it in an outbound queue for delivery.
The queue in the MTA is processed based on First Come First Serve (FCFS) or some
other priority basis depending on the MTA configuration. Once the message is ready to
be delivered, there are several things a sender MTA should do to transfer the mail:
6

•

Determine the destination of the mail

•

Establish a TCP connection with the next MTA

•

Transfer the contents of the mail using SMTP as communication protocol

•

Shut down the connection.
To determine the destination of the mail, MTA uses the receiver’s email address,

which contains the FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name). MTA uses the Domain Name
System (DNS) to obtain the IP address of the receiver’s MTA. To do this the MTA
performs a DNS query requesting the receiver’s MTA IP address. The MTA information
is stored in mail exchange record (MX record) of the DNS entry for the domain. The MX
record of the domain contains the host name of the mail exchanger of the receiver domain
and the preference number of that exchanger. The MTA picks one of the hosts and
delivers the mail using SMTP.
The next step involved in sending a mail is establishing an SMTP connection.
This involves making a TCP connection to port 25 of the MTA or mail server. Sending
the contents of the mail includes SMTP commands/replies between a client and server.
There are several standard SMTP commands. Most prominent among them are HELO,
MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA and QUIT. Section 2.1.3 describes these commands in
detail. Once the mail is delivered, the session is disconnected via the QUIT command.
2.1.3 Steps Involved in Sending and Receiving an Email
The Figure 2.2 shows the simple commands and replies involved in sending a
mail. The numbers in front of the replies sent from SMTP server to SMTP client
represent the reply codes. The client uses HELO command to introduce itself to the
7

SMTP server. The domain argument that is provided with HELO is used to populate the
“received:“ header and “from:” header in the email headers. Once the HELO
command is received the server responds with a 250 reply code containing its domain
name. After this command is successful, both client and server are ready for further
SMTP commands. The MAIL FROM command is the first command in the mail
transaction. The address that is provided with this command is used to populate the
“reverse-path:” header in the email headers. The server validates the domain name
of the sender by checking whether the domain exists. To issue a RCPT TO command, the
MAIL FROM command must be successful. The argument with this command provides
the recipient’s email address. The address that is provided with this command is used to
populate the “forward-path:” header. There can be several RCPT TO commands
for one mail transaction.
The client uses a DATA command to send the actual mail content. The message
provided with this data is used by the MTA to populate the mail-data buffer. Before using
the DATA command, the MAIL FROM and RCPT TO commands should be issued. The
end of the message is indicated via a single dot on a line by itself. Thus care should be
taken to avoid a single dot on a line by itself in the actual content. If a single dot on a line
is required in the data, dot stuffing is done by the server, which adds an extra dot beside
the single dot. The QUIT command is issued by the sender after delivering the data. This
command terminates the established connection.

8

Figure 2.2: Steps Involved in SMTP Handshake
2.2 Spoofing of SMTP Headers
Email spoofing means forging of SMTP header information in order to hide the
actual origin of email. The spoofed email looks like it originated from somewhere else
other than the actual source. To send spoofed email, a sender typically forges someone’s
email address to send the email.
Spoofing is possible because of vulnerability in SMTP protocol, which doesn’t
validate the sender of the email. This section describes the SMTP headers that are
susceptible to spoofing. The “from” or “Reply-to” header is easily susceptible to
spoofing. While doing an SMTP handshake, the MAIL FROM command can take any
9

mail address; nowhere in the complete transaction is this address checked. The sender
may provide any existing domain name and an existent or non-existent user in the
domain. The mail is accepted and delivered to the destination. Another header that
reveals the information is the “Received:” header. This header consists of the path the
mail traveled before reaching the destination. The source domain and all the intermediate
domains add a new “Received:” header to the email. Even this header is spoofable,
however, through the introduction of dummy mail servers prior to the actual relaying of
the mail through the network.
Spoofing is possible at two levels, the domain and the user levels. Domain level
spoofing means forging a valid domain name in the SMTP header while sending the mail.
This technique is used by the spammers to hide their original domain name and prevent
their domain from being black listed. Black listing is a technique in which a domain that
sends spam is added to the list of blocked domain databases. In domain level spoofing a
valid domain name and non-existent user name is provided in the forged address. In user
level spoofing a valid domain name and user of that domain is forged. User-level
authentication helps in preventing users from spoofing other users within the domain.
This SMTP vulnerability has resulted in other problems like spamming, phishing
and email-generated viruses. Spammers and virus generators can send email to anyone
easily by spoofing email headers to hide their identity. Recent statistics on spam by
Verisign Inc. show that over 80% of the email traffic was recognized as illegitimate
spam. The same statistics also show an increase in email generated viruses and worms
such as Melissa, Love Bug, Bagle Worm, and Killer Resume.
10

2.3 The Problem of Spam
Spam has become a major security issue in the email infrastructure. Its several
disadvantages include the waste of resources like network bandwidth and it adds extra
traffic in the network, which results in additional delay in the network. This affects other
application in the network. Spam wastes time for workers in the organization in the form
of categorizing and removing emails. It adds extra load on system administrators and
mail servers who have to handle more traffic. Also, children receiving spam are exposed
to adult content received through emails.
2.3.1 Techniques Used for Spamming Emails
This section discusses the techniques spammers use. These techniques include
email harvesting, blasting through open relays, and using zombie servers and temporary
servers.
Email harvesting is a technique spammers use to acquire email addresses.
Harvesting is done by programs that look for email addresses from websites, chat rooms,
newsgroups, and online directories for web pages and domains. Reference [14] describes
the techniques spam receivers can follow to circumvent the harvesting software. Email
masking is used to alter published email addresses so that harvesters do not recognize
them as valid email addresses. In email masking the address is masked by adding some
logical text that human beings can interpret to extract the proper email address and trick
the harvesting programs.
Open relays are used by spammers for sending millions of emails. Open relays
refer to a mail server that allows anyone to connect to it and thus send email anywhere.
11

This relaying has its own advantages, like support for mail forwarding, and the fact that
users of that domain can send from anywhere on the Internet [18]. But this feature is
abused by the spammers to send illegitimate emails. RFC 2505 [22] provides several
recommendations for SMTP MTAs to reduce spam. It describes that closing of open
relay is one of the practices that helps in reducing spam. Nowadays an open relay is
blacklisted. Reference [26] shows a sample black listed database.
A zombie server refers to a computer that is infected by a Trojan horse virus that
changes the settings of the infected computers and makes them work like an open relay
for sending emails. According to Sandvine [32], a network management firm, 80% of
spam was generated by zombie servers. Spammers host temporary mail servers to blast
out mail, and shut down a server to divert the in-bound SMTP traffic coming from
undelivered mail.
2.4 Existing Methods to Control Spam
Several methods have been proposed and implemented to reduce the amount of
spam. The proposed techniques vary widely depending on the vulnerability they address,
the technique they use, and the location where they are implemented. The existing
methods can be broadly classified as filtering, sender authentication mechanisms, and
payment-based methods.
2.4.1 Filtering
Filtering is a technique through which incoming mail is verified, suspicious mail
is classified as spam, and only mail that passes verification is delivered to the receiver.
This filtering is usually done by the filter software that executes either at the receiver
12

before delivering the mail, or in the mail server that receives mail for that domain.
Filtering is easy to implement over existing email systems.
2.4.1.1 Filtering at the Receiver
Filtering of email at the receiver or at the receiver’s SMTP server has become
commonplace.

Prominent filtering methods include keyword filters, scoring filters, and

Bayesian filters. In keyword filtering, the contents of the email are searched for keywords
that are most likely to appear in spam. A database for these keywords is maintained and
constantly updated. Bypassing these filters is a very trivial task for spammers. Scoring
filters are more efficient than keyword filters; these filters establish some rules and, based
on them, assign a score to the keywords. The higher the score, the greater possibility of
spam being present. The rules need to be constantly updated to maintain the efficiency of
the filter. Bayesian filtering is the most accurate way to control spam [17]. This method
uses the mail previously received by the user to form rules and a keyword database that
dynamically adapts itself.
The solution offered by the filtering techniques is temporary, however. They need
constant updating and sometimes are error prone due to false positives. (Some legitimate
mails are classified as spam.) False positives resulting from filtering may be a more
serious threat to users than spam [35].
2.4.1.2 Filtering in the Internet
The mail server that receives mail for the domain can also employ filtering
techniques such as black listing and white listing. Black listing is a technique by which
the known domains that relay spam are listed in the database. The receiver’s mail server
13

checks the source of the mail it receives. If the domain is listed in the black list database
the mail is classified as spam. White listing is a technique by which the mail received
from addresses that are present in the address book of the receiver is assumed to be
legitimate and is delivered to the receiver without any further filtering.
Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse (DCC) [12] and Vipul’s Razor [37] are the
two filtering techniques that rely on the fact that exactly the same spam mail is sent to
several recipients within the domain. In this technique, when a user receives spam, the
message is hashed and the checksum value is placed in the Vipul’s server or DCC server.
The recipient, after receiving an email, can hash and check if the hash is listed in the
Vipul’s or DCC server. If it is listed, the email is assumed to be spam and can be
discarded.
2.4.2 Sender Authentication Techniques
The sender authentication techniques do not rely on the contents of email to
decide whether the mail is genuine; instead they try to check the source of the mail,
authenticating the sender of the mail and accepting any mail from a valid sender. The
motivation behind such techniques is the fact that most spammers forge their identity and
use unreliable sources for spamming. These techniques can be classified as anti-spoof
techniques and central certifying authority techniques.
2.4.2.1 Anti-spoof Techniques
These techniques avoid spoofing of email addresses and force spammers to send
mail from their own domain. In these techniques the validation of the source of the mail
14

is done at the receiver side. The techniques discussed here are SPF [21], Yahoo domain
keys [10], sender ID [24], and TEOS [33].
SPF stands for Sender Policy Framework. Figure 2.3 shows the operation of SPF.
In general, every domain has its own designated mail servers that send the SMTP traffic
from that domain and act as mail exchangers. In SPF, every domain should publish the
SPF records for each mail server of the domain. The format of SPF records is described
in the Internet draft: each record should consist of the IP address of the mail server that
delivers the mail. The SPF records are published in the DNS. The existing DNS records
require modifications to include the SPF records. This makes the sending domain SPF
compliant.

Figure 2.3: Overview of SPF

15

An SPF client should be installed on the receiver’s side either on the receiver’s
user agent or mail server. An SPF client is capable of interpreting the SPF declarations
for a domain. After receiving the mail, an SPF client extracts the sender’s IP address
from the “Received:” header and the domain name from the “From:” header of the
email and performs the DNS lookup for the SPF record for that domain. Depending on
the response from the DNS, it validates the sender. However SPF can detect only domain
level spoofing. The user within the domain can forge other users in the same domain.
Sender ID [24] is a new proposal by Microsoft that relies on SPF. It addresses
some of the issues that are not dealt with in SPF. Sender ID enhances SPF by allowing
mail forwarding, enhancing the mechanism for mailing lists and mobile users. In Sender
ID, the SPF records are published using XML format, unlike in SPF, where records are
published in plain text. Sender ID doesn’t provide more protection than SPF.
Yahoo, Inc. proposed another solution called Yahoo Domain Keys [10]. This
technique uses PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) for sender authentication. In this
technique, every domain should generate a public/private key. The public key should be
published in the DNS. The mail sent from the domain is digitally signed with the private
key of the domain and the signature is sent along with the mail. Figure 2.4 shows the
operation of Yahoo Domain Keys. On the receiver side, the receiver extracts the domain
name from the mail, and obtains the public key corresponding to that domain. Using the
obtained public key the receiver signs the received mail and compares the signature with
the one obtained in the mail. If both signatures match the mail is not spoofed. Even
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Yahoo domain keys like SPF and Sender ID detects only domain level spoofing. None of
these techniques can detect spoofing within the domain

Figure 2.4: Overview of Yahoo Domain Keys
TEOS [33] stands for Trusted Email Open Standard. This standard describes a
new sender authentication policy and message assertion system for getting accurate
information about the sender and the message. It describes three levels of security: for
normal senders, bulk senders and commercial senders. In the first level of security, the
sender SMTP server should run Trusted Email Send Engine (TESE) and the receiver
should run Trusted Email Receive Engine (TERE). The TESE generates a securely
verifiable statement of sender domain identity before sending the mail. The statement is
verified by the TERE. If the identity fails the sender domain is revoked. The statement is
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sent as an SMTP header. This process avoids domain level. In the second level security,
along with first level, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) certificates are used to avoid both
domain and user level spoofing. The third security level adds more accountability of the
sender by using fully verified digital certificates for each email generated. The receiver
should validate the certificate, and if the validation fails the mail is discarded.
2.4.2.2 Trusted Third Party (TTP) - Certifying Authority
In trusted third party techniques, both the sender and receiver of the mail trust a
central authority, which validates both the sender and the receiver. The central authority
can pre-sign the mail or check the validity of the sender at the receiver’s request once the
mail has been received.
Microsoft has proposed a technique called Ticket server [1], which acts as a
central authority. In this technique, every sender must have a ticket in order to send mail.
Later, the receiver cancels the ticket and refunds the sender if the mail is from a trusted
source. This technique uses a PKC. The sender, receiver, ticket and ticket server have a
unique key for identification. The ticket server issues a challenge to the sender. After
getting the appropriate response, a ticket is issued to the receiver. The sender encrypts the
message with the obtained ticket and transmits the encrypted mail. After receiving the
mail, the receiver authenticates it with the ticket server using an identification key and
obtains the key of the sender. Later, the receiver encrypts the message with the sender’s
key to obtain the actual message. Optionally, the receiver can refund the key to the
sender.
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Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [5] is another technique, which uses a PKC for
authorizing the sender and the contents of the mail. In this technique, each sender should
have a unique public-private key pair; before the mail is sent out, the message is signed
with the sender’s private key. The public key is published in the PGP key server, or on
the sender’s website. After receiving the mail, the receiver decrypts the mail with the
public key. This technique avoids spoofing at the user level.
2.4.3 Payment-based Methods
Payment-based methods make spam expensive to send. The motivation behind
such methods is that spam is used as a source of advertising and marketing because it is
the most economic way to reach people around the world. Payment based methods can be
classified as monetary payment schemes, CPU cycle payment schemes, and memory
payment schemes.
2.4.3.1 Monetary Payment Schemes
In monetary payment schemes, to make spam expensive to send, real currency
mechanisms were proposed. Basically, the sender should spend money to send mail.
Reference [29] describes Payword and Micromint, two micro-payment protocols.
Reference [38] describes an enhanced micro-payment scheme. The practical
implementation of such schemes for email systems did not seem feasible, since the mail
had no currency and country limits. Cashramspam [9] was the first monetary payment
scheme to be successfully implemented, and it was done so in Australia. In this system,
users create accounts with Cashramspam and maintain a balance using credit cards.
Though this may reduce spam, it is by nature susceptible to several forms of identity
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theft, as the credit card and other personal information need to be provided for
transactions with Cashramspam.
2.4.3.2 CPU Cycle Payment Schemes
In CPU payment schemes, the sender of an email pays in terms of CPU cycles. In
these techniques, a sender is issued puzzles that are CPU intensive. The result the sender
sends to the receiver acts as a proof of work. If the result is acceptable, the mail is viewed
by the receiver. With CPU payment schemes some of the resources on the sender side
will be utilized for solving the puzzles, which may result in reducing the rate of
spamming. The selection of the puzzles should be such that a normal user does not incur
much load while sending mail, whereas for spammer, who is sending millions of emails
per hour, the puzzles should cause an overload. In addition the puzzles should be easy to
generate, easy to verify for the receiver, but time-consuming to solve for the sender.
Reference [3] describes the hashcash scheme, which proposes the hashcash cost-function
that can be used as a proof of work done by the sender of an email. Camram [8] is
another payment scheme, which implements the concept of postage for electronic mail.
One important feature the puzzle issued to the sender, should exhibit is a predictable
solving time. Reference [30] proposes Time-Lock puzzles, whose solving time is
predictable and are thus well suited for email systems. The amount of time required to
solve the puzzles is deterministic. These puzzles are easy to create and verify and they
cannot be parallelized.
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2.4.3.3 Memory Payment Schemes
Memory payment schemes are similar to CPU cycle payment schemes but the
puzzles that are issued to the sender are memory access intensive rather than CPU cycle
intensive. The basic motivation for such schemes is that the time taken for solving the
CPU intensive puzzles depends on the speed of the processor. For faster processors, time
taken is less when compared to slower processors. Reference [2] proposes that the
memory access speeds vary across machines much less than do CPU speeds; it also
proposes that memory-bound functions may behave more similarly than CPU-bound
functions. Reference [13] describes a few memory intensive puzzles, and proves by
experimental results that memory-bound functions show more similarly than CPU- bound
functions with slow and fast processors.
IM2000 [7] is a new protocol proposed by D. J. Bernstein. The gist of the protocol
is that after the sender sends email it is not delivered to the receiver. Instead, it is stored
under the sender’s disk quota in the sender’s mail server and a brief notification is sent to
the receiver that an email is waiting from the sender. The receiver can download the mail
directly from the sender’s mail server if he or she trusts the sender. This protocol forces
the sender to store all his sent mail. This makes it impossible to send millions of emails
due to physical space constraints in any realistic sender. The receiver downloads the mail
from sender’s server directly. So all the spam mails would not be stored up by receivers.

21

2.5 Summary of Existing Methods of Controlling Spam
This chapter classified the existing solutions to three categories: filtering
techniques, sender authentication techniques, and sender payment techniques. The figure
2.5 below shows the detailed classification of existing solutions to control spam.

Figure 2.5: Classification of Existing Techniques to Control Spam
The conclusion that can be made after analyzing all the techniques is that no
single solution can completely prevent or block spam. The filtering techniques either at
the receiver or in the Internet needs constant maintenance with updating of filtering rules;
Sender authentication techniques can solve the problem of spoofing, which helps in
mitigating the problem of spam but doesn’t solve the spam problem. The trusted third
party sender authentication techniques are helpful, if deployed widely by all the existing
servers. The sender payment schemes make spam expensive to send, but are difficult to
implement.
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CHAPTER 3
EMAIL++: NEW METHOD TO AUTHENTICATE EMAIL SENDER
This chapter describes the design, implementation, operation and validation of a
new email sender authentication mechanism called Email++.
3.1 Objective
The objective is to design a new mechanism for authenticating the sender of an
email. This mechanism can detect spoofing of email addresses and thus prevent an email
receiving user agent from actually receiving a spoofed email. This makes SMTP a more
secure communication format for email. The mechanism should conform to the
requirements specified below.
3.2 Requirements of Sender Authentication System
This section describes the requirements of the new authentication mechanism.
•

Compatible to the existing email system, with minimal changes to the existing
SMTP.

•

Capable of detecting both domain level and user level spoofing.

•

Should not degrade the throughput or increase resource utilization and latency of
the mail server or the mail client.

•

Should not introduce any extra security threats that are not there in the existing
email system.
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•

Should be easily implementable over the existing system without involving
complex changes to the design of existing system.

3.3 Overview of Email++
This section presents an overview of Email++. For each email sent out from an
authentic user of the domain, the sender's SMTP server calculates the MD5 hash [28] of
the email and stores it in the user’s account. The receiver, after receiving the email,
calculates the MD5 value and sends it back to the sender's SMTP server. This
communication is achieved via an out-of-band TCP connection made on some predetermined port number. The receiver stores the mail in a temporary folder before
delivering it to the inbox. If the mail is legitimate, then the MD5 value of the sender and
the receiver should match. If this is the case, the sender's SMTP server sends
"EMAIL_OK" to the receiver, and the mail is moved from the temporary folder to the
receiver's inbox. In the case of spoofed email, the MD5 hash value of the receiver cannot
be found at the sender and the mail is deleted from the temporary folder without being
sent to the receiver's inbox.
Using an out-of-band TCP connection for sender validation is the key concept
in Email++. To accomplish this, the sender's SMTP server runs a service for validating
users of its domain. The receiver takes the domain information of the sender from the
SMTP headers of the received mail and uses this domain information to query the DNS
servers for the valid IP address of the sender’s SMTP server. The receiver connects to the
sender’s SMTP server on a predetermined port number.
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One more advantage to using this out-of-band connection is that the sender’s SMTP
server will be overloaded with a huge amount of queries from all of the users who
received the email. If a spammer bursts out millions of emails, then his or her SMTP
servers will have to answer millions of queries, which may result in Denial of Service
(DoS) [16]. This forces the SMTP servers to validate their users before accepting an
email, or place a limit on the amount of mail that a user can send.
3.4 Design of Email++
The existing SMTP protocol does not validate the sender’s identity before accepting
email for forwarding. This makes it easy for the sender to forge any domain or user
identity within the domain. This vulnerability made spoofing and in turn spamming easy.
Email++ addresses this issue by adding sender authentication capabilities to SMTP,
making it more secure. This authentication is incorporated by making the receiver query
the sender SMTP server to make sure the mail was in fact sent from the valid user of the
domain. The figure below shows the normal email flow shown in Chapter 2 along with
the incorporated new Email++ authentication capability.
From the Figure 3.1 we can see that the sender SMTP server and receiver host are
involved in the authentication process. Both SMTP server and receiver host need
modifications in order to incorporate the new authentication capability. This is achieved
by adding the server modifications to the sender SMTP server, through an Email++
server, and the client modifications at the receiver through an Email++ client. The
Email++ server is responsible for running the authentication service. The Email++ client
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is responsible for authenticating the sender of an email. The Figure 3.2 shows the new
added components.

Figure 3.1: Email Flow Along with Email++ Authentication Capability
The dotted lines in Figure 3.2 indicate the new components added in Email++ that
does not exist in the normal SMTP. The design of a new authentication mechanism is
discussed separately for Email++ client and Email++ server.

Figure 3.2: Top-level Design of Email++
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3.4.1 Design of Email++ Server
This section describes the design of Email++ server. The Email++ enabled
SMTP server must authenticate the sender before accepting the mail. If the authentication
is successful then the email information is stored in the user’s account. The Email++
enabled SMTP server should also host a validation service that accepts a request from the
receiver and sends a response back. The response should indicate whether the mail was
really sent from the valid user of that domain. Figure 3.3 shows the functionality of the
Email++ server.

Figure 3.3: The Functionality of Email++ Server
In order to identify the valid senders of the domain, the SMTP server issues
some challenges. This challenge response can be a simple username and a password. All
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users should be authenticated before they are allowed to use any services from the SMTP
server.
3.4.1.1 Generating MD5 Hashes for Authenticated Users
Once the user is authenticated successfully, the Email++ server module extracts
the required data from the SMTP headers for generating the MD5 hashes and saves the
hash information in the user accounts. This functionality is shown as 1 in Figure 3.3.
Only the email message and the receiver’s email address are used in generating the
hashes, because these contents are not modified in the email transit. One advantage of
using the receiver’s email address for generating the MD5 hash is that a sender who is
sending to multiple recipients needs to generate multiple hashes. If the sender is a
spammer relaying millions of emails, MD5 hash generation may cause an extra overhead.
Figure 3.4 below shows a sample SMTP session. The underlined contents are used for
generating the MD5 hash value.
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220 localhost.localdomain ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.5/8.12.5; 14:36:18 -0400
HELO MICKEY
250 localhost.localdomain Hello giga4.csee.usf.edu [131.247.2.17], pleased to meet
MAIL FROM:sender@mydomain.com
250 2.1.0 ssakamur@mickey.csee.usf.edu... Sender ok
RCPT TO:receiver@somedomain.com
250 2.1.5 ssakamur@mickey.csee.usf.edu... Recipient ok
Figure 3.3
The functionality of Email++ server
DATA
354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
This is the body of the message
.
250 2.0.0 i94IaIWI004759 Message accepted for delivery
Figure 3.4: Contents Used for Generating the MD5 Hash
The RCPT TO: value and the DATA value are sent as input to the MD5 hash
generating algorithm, which generates the 128-bit hash value. Figure 3.5 shows the
sample hash generation for the above mail.

Figure 3.5: Hash Generation Process
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The hash value that is generated is a constant 128-bit value for any size of
message. This hash value and the timestamp showing when the mail was accepted for
delivery are stored in a separate log in each user account. The Email++ server accesses
the account of the sender and saves the information for each email sent out by the sender.
The stored information is of the format shown in Figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6 : Stored MD5 Message Format
The timestamp value is added to the contents of the mail and sent to the receiver. The
overall functionality of hash generation and storing of information is shown in figure 3.7

Figure 3.7: MD5 Hashing and Storing Process
All mail that reaches the SMTP server is forwarded in the network. The mail
received from authenticated users (i.e. those users who authenticated successfully with
username and password) is hashed and the information is stored in the respective user
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accounts and forwarded in the network. Even the mail received from users who did not
authenticate successfully is forwarded in the network, assuming these users are using this
domain mail server as an intermediate MTA. Thus Email++ allows open relaying and at
the same time distinguishes the valid users of the domain.
3.4.1.2 Running the Sender Validation Service
The sender SMTP server should host a validation service on some predetermined port number for validating its domain users. This service is shown as 2 in
Figure 3.3. The service should accept the out-of-band TCP connections from the
receivers and obtain the account information and MD5 hash of the received mail. This
information is compared against the information in the corresponding user’s account. If a
match is found an “EMAIL_OK” message is sent back to the receiver. If not, the message
“EMAIL_FAIL” is returned to the receiver.

“EMAIL_OK” implies that the mail

originated from that specific domain and that the user was authenticated with the mail
server before sending the mail. “EMAIL_FAIL” implies that the mail apparently
originated in that specific domain, but that the user was not authenticated with the mail
server, which means that the mail may be spoofed. Figure 3.8 below shows the
communication between the receiver and the sender SMTP server.
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Figure 3.8: Out of Band TCP Connection
3.4.2 Design of Email++ Client
On the receiver side, the Email++ client receives the mail from the receiver’s
mail server before it is delivered to the receiver’s inbox. The Email++ client implements
a temporary mailbox, which stores all the new mail that is to be validated. Only the
validated mail is placed in the receiver’s mailbox. The process of sender authentication
involves (1) obtaining the sender SMTP server’s IP address to establish an out-of-band
TCP connection; and (2) using the established out-of-band connection to inquire the
sender’s mail server whether the sender is a valid user of the domain, and whether the
received mail was delivered from that domain. Figure 3.9 shows the functionality of the
Email++ client.
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Figure 3.9: Functionality of Email++ Client
3.4.2.1 Obtaining the Sender Mail Server’s IP Address
The most important issue for the receiver is getting the IP address of the
sender’s SMTP server. This function is labeled as 1 in Figure 3.9. The IP address can be
obtained from the SMTP headers in the mail, but the headers are not reliable as they are
susceptible to spoofing. In Email++, the receiver gets the IP address of the mail server by
contacting the DNS [25]. The receiver extracts the domain name of the sender from the
“Apparently-From” SMTP header and uses that domain name and queries the DNS
server for the mail server’s IP address. In the DNS records, the MX record consists of the
IP address of the mail server for a given domain.
3.4.2.2 Authenticating the Sender
The receiver uses the IP address obtained by querying the DNS server to make
an out-of-band TCP connection to the server on some predetermined port number. This
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port number should be the same as the port number that the Email++ server runs the
validation service. The receiver also extracts the mail contents and the time stamp from
the email. It appends the recipient mail address to the mail contents and generates the
MD5 hash value. The MD5 hash, the time stamp and the username of the sender are sent
to the sender’s email server on the established TCP connection. This is done by the
validation service in figure 3.9. The sender’s email server extracts the hash value and
searches for the matching MD5 value in the user’s account. If a match is found, the
sender is considered authenticated and the mail is not spoofed. If the mail is spoofed, the
sender’s address will be contacted but no MD5 match will be found in the sender’s
account as the sender did not send the mail, and an “EMAIL_FAIL“ will be sent back to
the receiver. This mechanism effectively detects spoofing both at the domain and user
level. The message formats used for the communication are shown below. The time
stamp is extracted from the mail contents and the sender name is taken from the
“Apparently-From:” header, which contains the sender’s email address.
If the response from the sender’s server to receiver is “EMAIL_OK”, the mail is
removed from temporary mailbox and placed in the user’s mailbox. If the reply is
EMAIL_FAIL, the Email++ client deletes the mail before it is sent to the receiver’s
inbox. The message formats used for communication are shown in Figure 3.10.

34

Figure 3.10: Message Formats for Out of Band Communications
3.5 Implementation of Email++
The Email++ mechanism can be incorporated into the existing SMTP
framework by adding the sender authentication functionality and MD5 hash management
functionality to the SMTP server. The validation service can be implemented as a
separate server, but should be running in the same host as the SMTP server. The sender
authentication is done using the Validate_Sender ( ) procedure. The procedure is shown
in Figure 3.11
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Figure 3.11: The Validate_sender Procedure
The Record_Information() procedure takes the contents of the mail
(MAIL_MESSAGE) and the recipient email address (RCPT_ADDRESS) extracted from
DATA and RCPT TO: SMTP commands. Figure 3.12 shows the flow chart for the
Record_Information( ) procedure.
The Generate_MD5_Hash( ) shown in figure 3.12 can be any MD5
implementation that is in conformance with the RFC 1321.
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Figure 3.12: Record_information Procedure
The Email++ client part can be added to the receiver’s UA. The client
part should establish an out-of-band TCP connection to the sender’s SMTP server, and
authenticate the sender. It should maintain a temporary mailbox for storing the mail
initially. The receiver should query the DNS to get the IP address of the sender. The
query/response can be a standard DNS query for MX record. Figure 3.13 shows the
implementation of flow of communication between the sender’s SMTP server and the
receiver.
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Figure 3.13: Implementation of Communication Between
Sender’s SMTP Server and the Receiver
If a sender payment scheme is to be implemented over the Email++
architecture, CPU-intensive puzzles like TimeLock Puzzles could be used. Reference
[13] describes the application of TimeLock puzzles. The established out-of-band
connection can be used by the receiver to issue the puzzle. The sender can send back the
result on the same TCP connection
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3.6 Operation of Email++
This section summarizes the operation of Email++ by showing the sequence of
steps involved in sending an email.
•

The sender MTA validates the sender by username/password, and accepts the
mail for delivery.

•

The validated sender information is stored in the MD5 log for each user. The
MD5 hash of the message and the timestamp showing when the message was
accepted for delivery are stored.

• All the mail received at the SMTP server is relayed in the network.
• Several intermediate MTA’s may be involved in routing the mail to its final
destination.
•

When the receiver checks the mail, all the new emails are initially directed to the
Email++ client, which stays in-between the receiver’s SMTP server and the
receiver. The Email++ client calculates the MD5 hash, and extracts the
timestamp.

•

Email++ client extracts the domain name from the MAIL FROM: SMTP header
and queries the DNS for the IP address.

•

The IP address obtained in Step 6 is used for establishing an out-of-band TCP
connection. The Email++ client sends the MD5 hash, timestamp and username to
the sender SMTP server. The MVS system checks for the matching MD5 in the
users account. If there is a match, it sends “EMAIL_OK”. If there is not a match,
it sends “EMAIL_FAIL”.
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•

Depending on the response, the mail is delivered to the receiver’s inbox. In case
of EMAIL_FAIL, the local policy (eg. To discard the email) will be applied to the
mail.

Figure 3.14: Steps Involved in Sending Email in Email++
3.7 Validation of Email++
This section describes the validation of Email++. The Email++ design is validated
by implementing both Email++ client and server programs in C language. The Email++
server is targeted to the Linux operating system.
A separate mail server for the csee.usf.edu domain is hosted and runs Sendmail
software. The client program is developed in C language and is targeted to Windows
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operating systems. The figures 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 shows the sequence of execution steps
for non-forged email. The “root” is sending email to “user”.
The username and password are “sai”. Figure 3.15 shows the client interface for
sending the email. The client is invoked by “root” to send mail to the “user”.

Figure 3.15: The Client Interface Used by “root” for Sending Email
The mail server validates the “root” and accepts the mail for delivery to the
“user”. The receiver of the mail invokes the Email++ client for checking the email. The
Email++ client gets the mail from the receiver’s mail server and performs the out-of-band
validation before placing the mail in user’s inbox. Figure 3.16 shows the output from the
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Email++ client. After receiving the EMAIL_OK command from the sender’s mail server,
the mail is moved to the receiver’s inbox and is mail is visible to the receiver.

Figure 3.16: The Client Interface Used By “user” for Checking Email
Figure 3.17 shows the sequence of events that occurs in Email++ server, which
accepts the TCP connection and receives the MD5 hash, timestamp and username, and
compares the hash value and the timestamp against the already stored values in the user’s
account. In this case as the email is not spoofed, an exact match for timestamp and MD5
hash were found in the root’s account. If the match is found “EMAIL_OK” command is
sent to the reciver.
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Figure 3.17: Output from Email++ Sender of Root’s Mailserver
3.7.1

Prevention of Spoofing
Consider the scenario where “root” is the valid sender of the domain

mickey.csee.usf.edu; “spoofer” from a different domain tries to spoof as “root”.
In the client program, which accepts the mail for delivery, the sender name is
given as root@mickey.csee.usf.edu. But in sender authentication, a valid username is
given and an invalid password is given (as “spoofer” does not know the password of
“root”). Figure 3.18 shows the client interface used by “spoofer” for sending email as
“root”.
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Figure 3.18: The Client Interface Used by “spoofer” for Sending Email as “root”
Figure 3.19 shows the screen shot of the interface used by “user” for checking email. In
this case the final status received is “EMAIL_FAIL”, which is the expected result for
spoofed email.
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Figure 3.19: The Client Interface Used by “user” for Checking Email
Figure 3.20 shows output from the Email++ server. When the wrong password is
entered, the sender’s information is not stored in the email server, since it is assumed that
he or she is not the valid user of the domain. Hence, when the authentication is done,
EMAIL_FAIL is received from the sender. Figure 3.20 shows the output from the mail
server.
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Figure 3.20: Output from the Email++ Server.
It is observed that the spoofer’s mail MD5 and timestamp are not stored in the
root’s account. The Email++ server returns EMAIL_FAIL to the receiver.
3.7.2 Prevention of Tampering
Consider the scenario where “root” is the valid sender of the domain
mickey.csee.usf.edu. The contents of the mail sent by “root” are modified in transit and
tested to see if the Email++ server identifies it.
After the mail is received, the contents of the mail are modified prior to the
generation of the hash value in the Email++ client program; This emulates the contents
being modified in transmission. The MD5 hash of the modified contents is sent in the
query to the sender’s Email++ server. Figure 3.21 shows the client interface for sending
mail. Figure 3.22 shows the output from Email++ client.
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Figure 3.21: The Client Interface Used by “root” for Sending Email
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Figure 3.22: The Client Interface Used by “user” for Checking Email
The MD5 value of the TamperedMessageuser@mickey.usf.edu should be
generated, instead extra characters “ab” are appended at the end and the MD5 hash is
generated. This emulates a message being tampered with in transit. Figure 3.23 shows the
output from the sender’s mail server.
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Figure 3.23: The Output from Email++ Server
It is observed that the hash value obtained doesn’t match with the hash value
that is stored, even though the timestamp matches. The Email++ server returns
EMAIL_FAIL to the receiver. Hence, the Email++ mechanism effectively identifies the
tampered mail.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARISON OF EMAIL++ TO EXISTING METHODS
Chapter 3 described the new authentication mechanism for email, called Email++.
It described the design, operation, implementation and validation of Email++. This
chapter compares Email++ with existing sender authentication techniques. Email++ is
compared with SPF (Sender Policy Framework) [21], Microsoft’s Sender ID [24], Yahoo
Domain Keys [10], Microsoft’s ticket server [24], ePrivacy’s Trusted Email Open
Standard (TEOS) [33], Cashramspam [9], and PGP (Pretty Good privacy)[25].
4.1 Classification of Sender Authentication Schemes
Sender authentication protocols considered in this chapter can be primarily
categorized (1) based on whether they use DNS or central authority for authenticating the
sender and (2) based on the level of the authentication such as domain level or user level.
The detailed classification is shown below.
•

Authentication strategy
DNS-based authentication.
Central authority-based authentication

•

Granularity of authentication
Domain level authentication
User level authentication
Handling temporary SMTP servers
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•

Security vulnerabilities
Susceptible to DNS attacks
Extra DNS load
Extra traffic load into network

•

Complexity of implementation
Needs a flag day
Needs modifications to SMTP protocol
Needs modifications to DNS

•

Miscellaneous features
Validates message content
Allows forwarding and relaying of mail

4.1.1 Classification Based on Authentication Strategy
Authentication strategy refers to the strategy followed by the authentication
scheme to check the validity of the sender information. The protocols discussed here
depend widely on either DNS or a central authority system for checking the correctness
of the sender’s information.
4.1.1.1 DNS-based Authentication
In DNS-based authentication schemes, the correctness of the information in the
SMTP headers is crosschecked with the information in the DNS, which is more reliable
than the SMTP headers. SPF, SenderID, Yahoo domain keys, Email++, and TEOS uses
DNS-based authentication and need modifications to DNS, whereas Email++ uses the
existing DNS system.
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4.1.1.2 Central Authority-based Authentication
Some of the proposals for sender authentication such as Microsoft Ticket server,
Cashramspam, and PGP use a central certifying authority for validating the sender. The
central authority either pre-authorizes the mail by digitally signing the email, or
authorizes the sender based on the receiver’s request. In Microsoft’s ticket server, the
sender is authorized based on the user’s request. In Cashramspam, each email is
authorized before it is actually delivered. In PGP, the centralized key server is used for
publishing the public key of the sender.
Both of the strategies described above have pros and cons. DNS-based systems
are advantageous because they use the existing system, but they are vulnerable to DNS
attacks. Centralized systems are advantageous because they are more secure, but they are
harder to implement than the DNS-based systems.
4.1.2 Classification Based on Granularity of Authentication
The sender authentication schemes can also be classified based on the granularity
of authentication, that is, to what extent the authentication is done and the levels of forgery
the scheme can detect.
4.1.2.1 Domain Level Authentication
Domain Level Authentication is the verification of the validity of the domain
name of the sender. This helps to identify domain level spoofing, and this is a significant
factor to consider, as it helps domains to safeguard their identity from spammers and
hackers. This authentication also inhibits bounced SMTP traffic from congesting the
domain. There are certain tradeoffs involved in achieving this authentication. The process
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may add latency in email delivery; some existing proposals require modifications to DNS
standards, and the process of authentication for each email consumes extra resources
including CPU, memory, and network bandwidth. SPF, Yahoo Domain keys, and Sender
ID use domain level authentication.
4.1.2.2 User Level Authentication
In user level-authentication, along with the domain name the actual sender is also
validated. In addition to avoiding domain-level forging, the user within the domain is also
validated before accepting an email. In addition to the tradeoffs associated with domain
level authentication, this mechanism can impose mandatory user validation features, like
username and password authentication, before the mail is accepted for delivery. This is
optional in current systems. Email++, Cashramspam, PGP, and Ticket server all use user
level authentication. Yahoo domain keys can be made more granular, but the current
proposal supports up to domain level only.
4.1.2.3 Temporary SMTP Servers
Temporary SMTP servers are the mail servers that are not always available. One
of the techniques used by spammers to avoid bounced SMTP traffic is to blast out
millions of emails and clog SMTP servers. If the sender’s server is temporary and not
available, the probability of the sent mail being a spam is high. So, the proposed
mechanism should ensure that the sender server is available before delivering the mail to
the receiver’s mailbox. This authentication process may add latency to the delivery of
mail. The process of authentication for each email adds some extra load to the receiver.
Only Email++ handles temporary SMTP servers.
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The schemes that are more granular are better. Email++ is better than the other
proposed techniques, as its granularity is up to user level. In addition, it handles
temporary SMTP servers.
4.1.3 Classification Based on Security Vulnerability
Another way to classify the techniques is based on their security vulnerabilities.
4.1.3.1 Susceptible to DNS Failures
Many anti-spoofing proposals like SPF, sender ID, Yahoo Domain Keys, and
Email++ completely rely on DNS for sender authentication. DNS itself is susceptible to
hacking, resulting in Man-In-The-Middle attacks, DNS spoofing, and DNS Hijacking [6].
The effect of all these DNS vulnerabilities on the proposed system should be carefully
explored.
4.1.3.2 Adds Extra DNS Load
DNS load is an important constraint to be considered. The extra load that the
sender authentication techniques add on the DNS server should be predictable. The new
system should not add a lot of DNS load. If the load added is too heavy for the DNS
server to handle, the system may crash and affect the other systems that use DNS for their
proper functioning. SPF, Sender ID, Yahoo Domain Keys, Email++, and TEOS all add
extra load on DNS.
4.1.3.3 Adds Extra Network Traffic
Schemes like Ticket Server, PGP, Email++, and Yahoo Domain Keys adds
extra traffic to the network. The extra traffic should be predictable, comparatively low,
and it should not degrade the performance of the existing system by introducing delays in
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transmission. Email++ adds more traffic into the network because of the out-of-band TCP
connections from receivers to senders.
4.1.4

Classification Based on Complexity of Implementation
One of the important requirements for the sender authentication scheme is its

complexity of implementation
4.1.4.1 Need a Flag Day
Flag Day can be described as a day on which there should be a complete
adaptation of the new proposed mechanism for the existing system to work properly from
the day after Flag Day. It can be described as a day on which all the existing email
systems should change to the new proposed system. Furthermore the email system is
down that day. This is the most important parameter to consider, because such drastic
adaptation may not be feasible in a real world implementation. A new system should coexist with the already prevalent email infrastructure. The mechanism should work even if
the majority of the email systems are not prepared to adopt the new system. The new
authentication mechanism should not be expected to bring about an abrupt change in the
overall existing system, but should rather bring about gradual change. All of the schemes
reviewed are designed to be gradually adoptable.
4.1.4.2 Modifications to SMTP Protocol
The new proposed mechanism should not modify the standard SMTP protocol.
As SMTP is widely deployed, a minor modification may result in an effect on the
majority of existing systems. If the modification to SMTP is mandatory, in order to make
it more secure, then the practical implementation of the scheme should be evaluated more
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thoroughly and carefully. The tradeoffs in implementing this include changes in the
current SMTP standards, which affect current systems. Email++, Yahoo Domain Keys,
and Ticket Server need modifications to SMTP protocol. Sender ID needs modifications
to the SMTP server in order to support forwarding.
4.1.4.3 DNS Modifications
Some of the sender authentication mechanisms described in Chapter 2 use DNS
records for the validation of the sender identity. Some mechanisms propose modifying
the DNS protocol by adding extra records or data to achieve this. This modification may
also impact other systems that use DNS. The proposed mechanism should not modify the
DNS or, if the modification is mandatory, the impact of the modification should be
inspected carefully. Implementing such a mechanism may result in changes in current
standards. SPF, Sender ID, Yahoo Domain Keys need modifications to DNS. Email++,
even though it uses DNS-based authentication, needs no modification to DNS.
The authentication mechanism should be simple and easily implementable. It
should not require a flag day, but should favor gradual adaptation. It should propose no or
minimal changes to the SMTP and DNS protocols, and the modifications should be
backward compatible.
4.1.5

Miscellaneous Features

4.1.5.1 Validates Message Content
Some of the mechanisms like SPF and Sender ID validate the sender, but not the
contents sent. Content validation is important, as the data may be tampered with in the
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transmission, either intentionally or accidentally [31]. Email++, PGP, Yahoo Domain
Keys, and Ticket Server validate the message content.
4.1.5.2 Allows Relaying
Stopping open relaying is one of the common security measures taken by
domain administrators to protect their domain. But when SMTP was designed, relaying
was included on purpose. There are several advantages of relaying as described in [42].
For this reason, a new mechanism that favors relaying is better than the one that hinders
it. Another research study at Internet Mail Consortium shows that the amount of spam is
not related to the number of open relays [12]. Sender ID and Email++ allow for the
relaying of mail.
4.2 Comparison to Existing Sender Authentication Techniques
This section tabulates the summary of the comparison of SPF, Sender ID, Yahoo
Domain Keys, Microsoft Ticket Server, TEOS, Cashramspam, PGP, and Email++.
Tables 1 and 2 show the comparison charts.
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Table 4.1 Summary of Existing Anti-spoof Techniques
Name

SPF

Sender ID

TEOS

Yahoo
Domain keys

Email++

Detect Domain
Level spoofing

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Detect user level
spoofing

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Doesn’t Need a
Flag Day

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Doesn’t need
modification to
SMTP Protocol

Yes

No

No

No

No**

Doesn’t need DNS
modifications

No

No

No

No

Yes

Not susceptible to
DNS failure

No

No

No

No

No

Validates message
content

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Doesn’t need
central certifying
authority

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Handles temporary
SMTP servers

No

No

No

No

Yes

Allows open
relaying

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

** In Email++ the SMTP protocol needs no modification as Email++ doesn’t add any
extra headers to the existing protocol. The Email++ server module can run as a separate
service, over an existing mail server.
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Table 4.2 Summary of Existing Anti Spam Techniques
Microsoft
Ticket
Server

CashRamSpam

PGP
(Pretty Good
Privacy)

Does user level
authentication

Yes

Yes

Yes

Doesn’t need Flag Day

No

Yes

Yes

Doesn’t need modification
to SMTP Protocol

Yes

Yes

Yes

Doesn’t need DNS
modifications

Yes

Yes

Yes

Not susceptible to DNS
failure

Yes

Yes

Yes

Validates message content

Yes

No

Yes

Doesn’t need Central
certifying authority

No

No

Yes**

Email sent in clear text

Yes

Yes

Yes

Public Key Cryptography

Yes

No

Yes

Name

** PGP doesn’t require central certifying authority, if the public key is not published in
the PGP key server.
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4.3 Summary of Comparison
•

Email++ is the better than other DNS-based authentication schemes as it
utilizes DNS, but requests no modification to the existing DNS.

•

Email++, PGP, Cashramspam, and Ticket Server that provide user-level
authentication are more advantageous than SPF, Yahoo Domain Keys, and
Sender ID.

•

SPF does not propose any modifications to SMTP; Email++ proposes no
modifications to DNS. Sender ID and Yahoo domain keys, proposes changes
to both SMTP and DNS.

•

All the DNS-based schemes are vulnerable to DNS attacks and introduce DNS
load. Email++, Ticket Server and PGP introduce more traffic in the network
than other schemes like SPF, Sender ID, and Yahoo Domain Keys, and TEOS.

•

Email++, Yahoo Domain Keys and PGP provide extra features, such as
validation of the message content. Email++ and sender ID support mail
relaying.
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CHAPTER 5
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF EMAIL++
5.1 Objectives
This chapter describes the performance evaluation of Email++. It describes the
metrics considered for evaluating the performance and the significance of each metric. It
also describes the experimental setup, design of each experiment and observations from
each experiment. It concludes with the summary of the performance evaluation.
5.2 Performance Measures of Interest
This section summarizes the most important criteria for the performance
evaluation of Email++.
5.2.1 CPU Demand
Email++ implementation in the sender SMTP server requires extra CPU resources
for MD5 calculations before sending mail and for satisfying out-of-band validation
requests from mail recipients. This is an important metric, which should be carefully
evaluated. If Email++ is CPU intensive, the net result may impact the performance of the
mail server. The extra overload on the server can lead to low throughput of the mail
server, and unpredictable latency in email delivery.
5.2.2 Memory Demand
The Email++ server at the sender side and the client at the recipient are not very
memory intensive. Extra disk space is required on the server side for maintaining the
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MD5 lists of mail for each user. The Email++ server and client modules require some
disk space.
5.2.3 Bandwidth Demand
Email++ adds extra traffic to the existing system by its out-of-band TCP
connections between client and server for validating the sender. For obtaining the IP
address of sender’s email server an additional DNS query increases the traffic further.
However the amount of extra traffic in out of band connections is predictable, as the size
of the hash value and timestamp are always constant for any size email. At the receiver,
the DNS query from receiver to its name server adds traffic equal to one normal DNS
query.
5.2.4 Increased Email Latency
The hashing of email, before delivery at the sender side and the validating of
email before placing it in the actual inbox of the receiver at the receiver side, adds some
latency to the actual delivery time. This latency is not exactly predictable, as it depends
on the server load, distance between the sender and receiver, bandwidth available, and
network conditions.
5.2.5 DNS Load
The Email++ mechanism adds an extra DNS request for each email that is
received for that domain. This may increase the load on the DNS server.
5.3 Experimental Setup
To test the specification of Email++, the Email++ client and Email++ server
modules were developed in C language. A new mail server called Email++ mail server
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was setup in the USF Computer Science and Engineering domain (csee domain). The
server module of Email++ was installed in the Email++ mail server. The Email++ client
module is installed and executed from the sender user agent, which generated the email
traffic. The mail server is configured in such a way that if the mail is for the local user of
the domain, it is kept in the user’s account otherwise it is forwarded to the common
gateway of the Computer Science and Engineering Domain network.

Figure 5.1: Experimental Setup
5.4 Design of Experiments
This section describes the design of experiments for evaluating the performance
of an Email++ client and server.
This section describes the experiments conducted to evaluate the performance of
the sender’s mail server. The performance metrics evaluated are CPU demand, memory
demand, and network bandwidth demand.
•

CPU utilization experiment: In this experiment, the sender sends 500 mails of
450 bytes each to the mail server and monitors the percentage of CPU utilized and
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the time taken for delivering the mails. The Linux tools SAR, vmstat and top were
used to get the monitoring information. The percentage of CPU utilized is
measured with the Linux perfmon tool. This experiment was run for both regular
SMTP and for Email++ enabled SMTP. The control variable is the number of
mails and the response variable is the percentage utilization of CPU.

•

Memory utilization experiment: This experiment evaluates the extra memory
resources required by the Email++, when compared to regular SMTP. In this
experiment the sender sends 500 mails of 450 bytes each and monitors the
percentage of main memory utilized by using the Linux monitoring tool top. The
control variable is the number of mails and the response variable is the percentage
utilization of main memory.

•

Bandwidth utilization experiment: This experiment measures the percentage of
extra bandwidth utilization of Email++. The client receives 500 mails of varying
size 0.5 KB, 1.5 KB, 2.5 KB, 3.5 KB, 4.5 KB, 5.5 KB, 6.5KB to measure how the
percentage of extra traffic generated by Email++ varies with the size of the mail.

5.5 Experimental Results
This section describes the results from the experiments described in the previous
section. This section also describes additional experiments conducted to further
understand or support the results from the defined experiments.
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Figure 5.2 shows the result from CPU utilization experiment. The results show
that Email++ enabled mail server takes more time for 500 mails than the normal SMTP
server.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of CPU Utilization of Regular SMTP and Email++
The percentage of CPU utilized is almost the same for both regular SMTP and
Email++ enabled SMTP. The Email++ enabled SMTP server consumes CPU resources
for longer time than the normal SMTP. The percentage increase in time for 500 mails is
about 11%. Hence per mail the percentage increase in time is 11 %. Email++ takes more
time to execute and hence uses CPU resources for longer time.
Figure 5.3 shows that the percentage of memory utilized by Email++ enabled mail
server is slightly larger than that of the regular SMTP. The maximum difference between
the percentages of memory utilization is nearly 3%.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of Memory Utilization of Regular SMTP and Email++
Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of extra traffic generated decreases as the size of
the mail increases. So as the mail size increases the relative amount of extra traffic
generated by Email++ decreases. In a worst case when the email size is less than 1KB the
percentage of extra traffic is about 40%. In an average case when the email size is 3.5KB
the percentage of extra traffic is around 15%.
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of Extra Traffic as Mail Size Increases
5.6 Discussion of Results
The CPU utilization experiment shows that the Email++ enabled mail server takes
11% more time for sending 500 emails of 450KB each. The extra time incurred was from
the MD5 calculations and the out of band connections. CPU utilization experiment #1
and CPU utilization experiment #2 were conducted to evaluate the time taken for MD5
calculations and out of band connections respectively.

•

CPU utilization experiment #1: In this experiment 500 mails of 450 bytes each
were sent to the mail server and the percent of CPU utilized and the time taken for
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delivering the mails is monitored by turning off the out-of-band validations. So
the extra time incurred in this case should be from the MD5 calculations alone.
Figure 5.5 shows the results of CPU utilization experiment #1. It suggests that the
amount of time and CPU utilized by MD5 calculations is negligible. The amount of time
incurred from MD5 computations for 500 emails of 450 bytes each is less than 1 sec.
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of CPU Utilization for MD5 Calculations Alone
CPU utilization experiment #2: This experiment measures the CPU utilization and time
taken for the out of band connections alone, by turning off MD5 calculations. In this
experiment 500 mails of 450 bytes each were sent to the mail server and the percent of
CPU utilized and the time taken for delivering the mails is monitored by turning on the
out-of-band validations. So the extra time incurred in this case should be from the out-ofband calculations alone.
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Figure 5.6 shows the results of CPU utilization experiment #2. The result suggests
that major portion of extra time is spent in out of band connections and validations than
the MD5 calculations.
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of CPU Utilization for Out-of-band Connections Alone
CPU utilization experiment #1 shows that the time taken for MD5 calculations of emails
of 450 bytes is negligible. To check how the time taken for MD5 calculations varies for
larger emails, the MD5 experiment was conducted.

MD5 experiment: This experiment computes the amount of time taken for 500 MD5
computations by increasing the email size to 1KB, 2KB, 4KB, 8KB, 16KB, and 32KB
Figure 5.7 shows the results of MD5 experiment. It shows that as the size of the
message increases from 1KB, 2KB, 4KB, 8KB, 16KB, and 32KB the amount of time
required for MD5 computation is approximately doubled. For 500 mails of 32Kbytes the
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time taken is nearly 1 second. The amount of time taken for 1 message of 1KB is 0.00006
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Figure 5.7: Time Taken for MD5 Calculations as Message Size Increases
The results from memory utilization experiment shows that the percentage of
memory utilized by Email++ server is nearly 3% more than the regular SMTP server.
From this we can conclude that Email++ is not very memory intensive. The amount of
disk space required for installing the Email++ server is 35KB. The amount of disk space
required for storing one MD5 record is 35 bytes.
The results from the bandwidth utilization experiment shows that as the size of
the email increases the percentage of the extra traffic decreases. This behavior is obvious
as Email++ adds a constant amount of traffic for any mail size. An experiment was
conducted to check how the throughput of the email server varies with increasing
message size.
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Throughput experiment: This experiment compares the throughput of regular SMTP and
Email++ enabled SMTP by increasing mail size. This experiment was conducted by
varying the mail size as 0.5KB, 1.5KB, 2.5KB, 4.5KB, and 6.5KB. The throughput is
calculated as number of mails per second.
Figure 5.8 show that there is a constant decrease in the throughput of regular
SMTP and Email++ enabled SMTP. The results can be justified as follows. The extra
overhead to the server comes from MD5 computations and out-of-band validations. As
the mail size increases the overhead incurred from MD5 validations is negligible as
shown in MD5 experiment. For out-of-band validations the amount of data sent is same
for any sized mail hence it takes same amount of time and resources. As the size of the
mail increases the percentage decrease in throughput is nearly constant.
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of Throughput of Regular SMTP and Email ++
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No extra load is added on DNS at the sender side. But the number of connections that
server should hold per email increases from two (one for SMTP and one for DNS) to
three (an extra connection for out-of-band connection.)
The extra CPU is required for calculating the MD5 calculations and the out-ofband connections. Each recipient should calculate one MD5 hash for each mail. From the
results of MD5 experiment, we can conclude the amount of time for one MD5 is
negligible.
Extra disk space is required for installing the MD5 client, which takes 92Kbytes
The Email++ client queries the DNS to get the IP address of the sender’s mail server.
Extra traffic generated by this query is equal to the traffic of one DNS query.
5.7 Summary of Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation of Email++ shows that an Email++ mailserver takes
11% more time than the regular SMTP server to process the same amount of mail. Most
of the extra time is spent in out-of-band validations and the time incurred from MD5
calculations is insignificant. The experiment results shows that Email++ is not very
memory intensive. The maximum memory utilization percentage difference between
regular SMTP server and Email++ mail server is shown to be approximately 3%.
Email++ is bandwidth intensive for small mails less than 1KB. It is shown that for
smaller mails the percentage of extra traffic is above 40%. But as the mail size increases
in the average case when the mail size is 3.5 KB the percentage of extra traffic is nearly
15%. The experimental results prove that Email++ adds minimal burden on the existing
system

without

degrading

the

performance
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of

that

system.

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Summary
Email has become a vital mode of communication and SMTP is the standard
protocol for its implementation. SMTP does not perform sender authentication and is thus
vulnerable to sender identification spoofing. This vulnerability is exploited by spammers.
In the current SMTP standard the sender is not accountable to the mail he/she sends.
Hence techniques to make SMTP more secure are required. This thesis describes a new
authentication mechanism called Email++ for validating the sender of an email.
The new authentication mechanism detects spoofing of the sender’s address by
verifying the address using an out-of-band connection to the sender’s mail server. This
mechanism also ensures that the contents of the mail are not tampered with in transit. The
authentication mechanism is implemented and validated. The impact of the mechanism
on the performance of the existing system is evaluated. The results show that the new
mechanism imposes 11% extra CPU overhead. The Memory demand is negligible. The
amount of extra traffic imposed is 15%. The extra load on DNS is one extra connection
per email sent.
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6.2 Enhancing Email++
One important issue is the consideration of multiple email servers for a single
domain. The current design of Email++ considers a single mail server per domain. This
should be extended to multiple email servers per domain environment.
A possible enhancement to Email++ would be to implement a sender payment
scheme over the existing system. The out-of-band communication channel can be used by
the receiver to issue a puzzle to the sender. The sender can send the results back to the
receiver using the same connection. The receiver can check the result and if its valid, the
mail is forwarded from temporary mailbox to the actual mailbox of the receiver. Having
the out-of-band connection mechanism in place makes it easy to implement the sender
payment schemes. In addition to that, once the sender gets through the out-of-band
authentication phase, its proved that both the sender and receiver are real not faked. This
helps to implement the sender payment scheme more securely.

6.3 Adaptation of Email++ to Other Systems
The basic idea in Email++ can be adapted to other systems that are susceptible to
spoofing. Source address spoofing is possible in cases where the sender does not require
any information back from the receiver. The idea in Email++ is to make a connection
back to the sender with the address the sender provided to make sure if it is valid. If the
sender provides a forged address, the forged address will be contacted, and hence the
source of the forgery can be identified.
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The DNS system is also susceptible to spoofing. DNS servers constantly update
their database with the latest information sent from other DNS servers. Some DNS
servers accept a response from any server and update its cache with the relevant
information. It does not really authenticate whether the response came from the true
domain. This also results in cache poisoning. The idea of an out-of-band connection can
be applied in this context where after the update is received by the DNS server, it
contacts the source to make sure that the data was in fact sent from the domain.
SMS messages can be classified as cell phone originated SMS, that is sending
SMS from cell phone to other cell phone, or web based SMS, sending SMS through web
interface to a cell phone. Both cell phone originated SMS and web based SMS are
susceptible to spoofing, but web based spoofing is easy to do. But web based SMS are
more susceptible to spoofing. The idea of an out-of-band connection for sender
authentication can be used to avoid SMS web based spoofing, where the web site domain
maintains a validation service, and the receiver makes an out-of-band connection to the
sender domain to make sure the message was in fact sent from the valid user of the
domain.
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